> ## Documentation Index > Fetch the complete documentation index at: https://docs.lerian.studio/llms.txt > Use this file to discover all available pages before exploring further. # Who has opened this shared session, and when > The disclosure audit: the recorded reads of this session by somebody other than its owner, newest first. It is what answers "who read this conversation" after the fact, and it is the one part of a share that outlives the data — revoking a share deletes what was copied and leaves this history standing, because an audit that went with the conversation could not say who had already read it. WHAT IS IN IT, AND WHAT DELIBERATELY IS NOT. A member's reads of their OWN sessions are not recorded: logging them would make this the largest thing in the store and would answer a question nobody asked. Reads of a session nobody published are not recorded either — there is no share for them to be recorded against. The entry names what was reached in the words of the road that served it — the session itself, an entry page, one media key — so a picture fetched out of a transcript is its own line rather than being folded into the conversation it came from. Reading this audit is NOT itself recorded: this list is about who opened the conversation, and mixing reads of the list into it would answer a second question in the same column. WHO MAY READ IT is narrower than who may read the session: its owner, or a member carrying `members:manage`. A colleague who may read the conversation may not read the list of everyone who has — that list is a statement about people rather than about the work, and the permission that governs who belongs to the organisation is the one that governs it. The private mark is deliberately not consulted here, for the reason marking one is not: somebody auditing who read a departed colleague's private session must not have to be able to read the conversation first, which is exactly the case the permission exists for. A caller who may not audit is answered 403 for every session that exists and 404 for one that does not, which is the pair every read of a session already answers. ## OpenAPI ````yaml /en/openapi/v3-current/narya.yaml get /v1/sessions/{sessionId}/share/disclosures openapi: 3.1.0 info: title: Narya Host API version: 1.0.0 description: >- The contract between the Narya host and every client. One long-lived host serves this API over a Unix socket in your Narya home. The terminal client and the one-shot command that Lerian ships drive this API, and a client you write drives the same one. Requests authenticate with a bearer token issued by the identity provider the host is configured with. An operation that declares another security scheme also accepts that credential. A request without a valid credential gets 401 with NRY-0011. A caller whose role lacks the permission an operation needs gets 403 with NRY-0028. Submitting a message returns 202 with a turn id. Everything the turn produces streams over GET /v1/events as server-sent events with a typed envelope, and a stream resumes from a Last-Event-ID header. One error envelope: code, title and message. Codes are NRY- followed by four digits. Cursors are opaque. servers: [] security: - bearerAuth: [] tags: - name: host description: The host process itself — version, uptime, mode, store. - name: sessions description: Durable conversation containers. Archive, never destroy. - name: messages description: Submitting work into a session and interrupting it. - name: events description: The server-sent event stream every client consumes. - name: lanes description: Parallel tracks inside a session — main, subagent, side. - name: agents description: Named recipes — instructions, tools, model, policy. Read-only in v1. - name: ladder description: >- What a person can type: the skills and command files in force for one repository, and expanding one into text. Five origins merged, nearest winning a name, the repository's own rungs gated on trust. - name: permissions description: Pending permission asks, decisions, and the decision audit. - name: intercom description: Sessions on one machine finding and messaging each other. - name: packages description: The one thing a user installs — resources, Go code, or both. - name: extensions description: >- Host-side extensions and the operations each exposes over the wire. This is the generic lane a host extension uses to serve its own client half (a TUI component, a web panel) or any API-only consumer, without adding routes to this contract. - name: workflows description: Deterministic multi-agent orchestration runs. - name: providers description: Model suppliers, their auth state, and the model catalogue. - name: monitors description: >- Long-running watchers a session keeps beside its conversation — a test runner in watch mode, a build, a log being followed. Started by the model or by the person, always listed, always killable. - name: records description: The queryable local record of everything that happened. - name: environments description: >- Where a session's code lives and its commands run — this machine, or a container narya operates. A session that names none runs here. - name: schedules description: >- Work the host's own clock starts with nobody present — a repository, a prompt, a rule and what one fire may spend. Cancel, never destroy. - name: sharing description: >- Publishing a session from a developer's own home to the organisation's, and what is held back before a byte leaves the machine. - name: refinements description: >- What this owner has taught narya and allowed it to keep — distilled facts, and the skills, agents and commands the model wrote for itself. Propose, read, consent, roll back. Nothing here fires until a person answers. - name: platform description: >- Calls Lerian's control plane made to a home it hosts, as this home recorded them. paths: /v1/sessions/{sessionId}/share/disclosures: parameters: - $ref: '#/components/parameters/SessionIdParam' get: tags: - sharing summary: Who has opened this shared session, and when description: >- The disclosure audit: the recorded reads of this session by somebody other than its owner, newest first. It is what answers "who read this conversation" after the fact, and it is the one part of a share that outlives the data — revoking a share deletes what was copied and leaves this history standing, because an audit that went with the conversation could not say who had already read it. WHAT IS IN IT, AND WHAT DELIBERATELY IS NOT. A member's reads of their OWN sessions are not recorded: logging them would make this the largest thing in the store and would answer a question nobody asked. Reads of a session nobody published are not recorded either — there is no share for them to be recorded against. The entry names what was reached in the words of the road that served it — the session itself, an entry page, one media key — so a picture fetched out of a transcript is its own line rather than being folded into the conversation it came from. Reading this audit is NOT itself recorded: this list is about who opened the conversation, and mixing reads of the list into it would answer a second question in the same column. WHO MAY READ IT is narrower than who may read the session: its owner, or a member carrying `members:manage`. A colleague who may read the conversation may not read the list of everyone who has — that list is a statement about people rather than about the work, and the permission that governs who belongs to the organisation is the one that governs it. The private mark is deliberately not consulted here, for the reason marking one is not: somebody auditing who read a departed colleague's private session must not have to be able to read the conversation first, which is exactly the case the permission exists for. A caller who may not audit is answered 403 for every session that exists and 404 for one that does not, which is the pair every read of a session already answers. operationId: listSessionDisclosures parameters: - $ref: '#/components/parameters/CursorParam' - $ref: '#/components/parameters/LimitParam' responses: '200': description: One page of accesses, newest first. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/DisclosurePage' '400': $ref: '#/components/responses/BadRequest' '403': $ref: '#/components/responses/Forbidden' '404': $ref: '#/components/responses/NotFound' '500': $ref: '#/components/responses/InternalServerError' components: parameters: SessionIdParam: name: sessionId in: path required: true description: The session's id. schema: type: string format: uuid CursorParam: name: cursor in: query required: false description: >- Opaque pagination cursor from a previous page's nextCursor or prevCursor. schema: type: string maxLength: 1024 LimitParam: name: limit in: query required: false description: Maximum items per page. schema: type: integer minimum: 1 maximum: 100 default: 25 schemas: DisclosurePage: type: object description: >- One page of a shared session's audit, newest first. An EMPTY page never means the audit is unavailable: a home that cannot read its own audit answers 500 rather than an empty list. required: - items - limit properties: items: type: array items: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Disclosure' limit: type: integer minimum: 1 nextCursor: type: string description: >- The position the next page starts from, present only when this home holds an older entry. There is no prevCursor: the audit is append-only and read backwards from the newest, so the page a client came from is the one it already has. examples: - items: - actor: user_01HZX3Q8N4KDPYV2A7C9M5T6RB reached: entries at: '2026-09-08T11:04:21.000Z' - actor: user_01HZX3Q8N4KDPYV2A7C9M5T6RB reached: media/screenshot.png at: '2026-09-08T11:04:19.000Z' limit: 25 Disclosure: type: object description: |- One access to a shared session: who reached what, and when. It names no share id and no session id. required: - actor - reached - at properties: actor: type: string description: >- The issuer's subject for whoever read it. It is an identifier and not a display name: names are the identity provider's to answer, they change, and a row in a table that never changes would go stale carrying one. A client that wants a face resolves it, exactly as it does for a session's owner. reached: type: string description: >- What was served, in the words of the road that served it: the session itself, an entry page, one media key. Deliberately not a fixed vocabulary — the honest answer is which surface was asked for, and an enum would have to be extended by every operation added afterwards, with an audit recording the wrong surface in the meantime. at: type: string format: date-time description: When the read was served, on the clock of the home that served it. Error: type: object description: >- The single error envelope every operation returns. Codes are NRY- followed by four digits and are catalogued in the top-level x-error-catalog extension. required: - code - title - message properties: code: type: string pattern: ^NRY-[0-9]{4}$ description: Machine-readable error code from the NRY catalogue. title: type: string maxLength: 256 description: Short human-readable summary of the error class. message: type: string maxLength: 4096 description: Specific, actionable description of what went wrong. fields: type: object description: Per-field validation problems. additionalProperties: type: string examples: - code: NRY-0002 title: Session not found message: >- No session with id 6b9f6d2e-1c3a-4f5b-9d7e-2a8c4e6f0b1d exists on this host. responses: BadRequest: description: Malformed request — invalid parameter, cursor, or JSON body. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' Forbidden: description: >- The caller is authenticated and is not allowed this operation (NRY-0028 or NRY-0030). content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' NotFound: description: The addressed resource does not exist on this host. content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' InternalServerError: description: The host failed — including a store that refuses writes (NRY-0012). content: application/json: schema: $ref: '#/components/schemas/Error' securitySchemes: bearerAuth: type: http scheme: bearer bearerFormat: JWT description: >- Enforced on every transport, with no exempt operation. A person's request — over the default local unix socket exactly as over a TCP listener — must carry a JWT issued by the configured identity provider, which the host verifies itself against that issuer's key set: signature, issuer, expiry, and the person and organisation it names. Requests without a valid one receive 401 NRY-0011. The socket's file permissions are transport and are not an authorisation. ````