Rotate an institution's connector-credentials KEK
Rotates the key that wraps this institution’s stored connector credentials — a DIFFERENT key from kek:rotate, which rotates the institution-data KEK governing PII. The Transit key advances and the stored credentials envelope is rebound to the new version; no credential is decrypted and no credential VALUE changes, so a leaked client_secret is NOT invalidated by this call (rotate the material itself with PATCH /v1/institutions/, and revoke it upstream). rewrapStatus reports whether the stored envelope was rebound or the row carried no sealed subtree to rebind. An institution that has never stored a connector credential has no credentials KEK and maps to 404, not to a rotation. A contended same-institution rotation maps to 409, and so does a concurrent change to this institution’s connector configuration (the KEK version has already advanced; retry to rebind the envelope). An unknown institution maps to 404. A committed-but-unaudited rotation maps to 500 (non-retryable; escalate).
Authorizations
JWT bearer token issued by the identity provider.
Path Parameters
The institution's unique identifier (UUID) whose connector-credentials KEK is rotated.
"44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444444"
Body
Optional operator-supplied free-text reason for the rotation (sealed verbatim into the audit payload).
"scheduled_annual_rotation"
Response
OK
The institution the rotation targeted.
"44444444-4444-4444-4444-444444444444"
The newly active KEK version.
"v3"
The KEK version that was active before the rotation.
"v2"
The rewrap progress status (e.g. IN_PROGRESS).
"IN_PROGRESS"
The RFC3339 timestamp the rotation committed.
"2026-06-08T12:00:00Z"

