Replay one quarantined inbound frame
Puts one parked frame’s stored bytes back through the inbound path, exactly as a live delivery runs them, because the reason it was refused — a message code or an element from a newer BACEN catalogue, a datastore that was down — has stopped being true. THE REPLAY SENDS NO NOTICE OF ITS OWN TO BACEN: no second courtesy notice, no correction, no retraction — the notice they already hold for these bytes stays a historical fact. But a frame that decodes and whose processing requires an answer PRODUCES that answer through the normal inbound path, possibly long after the original. The bytes are replayed verbatim; nothing is re-framed, re-addressed or repaired. One frame per command, never a sweep. An unknown parkKey is refused; a frame that was already replayed is refused naming who replayed it and when; a frame that fails again is refused and stays parked and replayable, with the reason readable as lastReplayError on the triage listing. Every attempt is recorded on the audit trail under the operator derived from the bearer token. Requires str-inbound-quarantine:replay — the triage read grant does not carry it.
Authorizations
JWT bearer token issued by the identity provider.
Headers
Idempotency key. Required on every mutation.
Idempotency key TTL in seconds (overrides the service default).
Path Parameters
The frame's identity: the 64-character lowercase sha256 hex of the raw parked bytes, as published on the triage listing.
Response
OK
Request-scoped correlation identifier echoing X-Request-ID, for pivoting from response to trace.
The frame's identity, echoed back.
"0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef0123456789abcdef"
True when this command both put the frame back through the inbound path and claimed the row. A concurrent command that lost the claim is refused with 409 instead.
Evidence row UUID of the frame that was replayed.
"2f8d1c40-0a1b-4c2d-8e3f-000000000001"
The stage the frame had originally been parked at.
"envelope_decode"

